Towards institutional gridlock? The limitations of Germany's consensus democracy.
German Policy Studies › Vol. 6 Nbr. 1, March 2010
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German Policy Studies › Vol. 6 Nbr. 1, March 2010
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Towards institutional gridlock? The limitations of Germany's consensus democracy.
1 Introduction: The unified Germany--a prisoner of the consensus democracy
This article examines the weaknesses of Germany's domestic polity on the basis of the domestic political developments following the 2005 general election. It argues that the formation of the second grand coalition government in Germany's post-war history has revealed the weaknesses of the internal mechanisms of Germany's multi-level consensus democracy. This is predominantly the result of the failure to undertake a substantial reform of the German polity at the time of reunification in 1990. The unified Germany is consequently governed on the basis of a "semisovereign" political system with a dispersion of power amongst multiple levels and weak agenda-setting powers of the federal executive. The inherent tendency of the German political system to force the two main parties CDU/CSU and SPD to cooperate, even if they are not in a formal coalition on the federal level, is hence in danger of being reinforced. The "grand coalition state" (Schmidt 2008: 64) has now reached the point where minimum winning coalitions lead by either of the major parties are practically unable to initiate substantial policy change because they are almost constantly faced with a regional chamber, the Bundesrat, which is dominated by the opposition parties. This either forces them into a grand coalition government on the federal level or demands at least informal cooperation in the regional chamber in order to avoid complete policy gridlock in crucial areas under a small minimum-winning coalition of either of the two larger parties with one or more of the smaller parties. Moreover, the experience with the second grand coalition led by chancellor Merkel between 2005 and 2009 showed that even substantial majorities in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat are not sufficient to guarantee substantial progress in major policy areas, as both parties are adamant to maintain their own electoral profile. The dissatisfaction of the electorate with the governing record of the two main parties was reflected in the result of the 2009 general election. The election confirmed a trend which benefits smaller parties, particularly the party of the left (Die Linke) at the expense of the catch-all status of the CDU/CSU and the SPD. The resulting new diversity in the German party system has increased the unpredictability of legislative outcomes in the complex interaction between the federal government and the regional governments in the Bundesrat. While the unified Germany is confronted with a challenging set of the internal and external challenges, fundamental policy reform in crucial areas such as economic policy, employment, welfare reform and education has hence become even harder to achieve. The German political system consequently risks becoming trapped in a vicious circle in which the decline in electoral support for the larger parties produces ever more complex bargaining processes between a new diversity of party coalitions on the federal and the regional level and subsequently prevents the introduction of a clear policy agenda. This development contradicts Lijphart's thesis who argued that "consensus democracies do clearly outperform the majoritarian democracies with regard to the quality of democracy and democratic representation" (Lijphart 1999: 301). This article takes issue with Lijphart's preference for the consensus model of democracy as the superior model in terms of democratic quality. The German case clearly illustrates that the essential characteristics of a consensus democracy, the decentralization of executive power in a federal system and a proportional electoral system, can lead to profound shortcomings in terms of the problem-solving capacity of the political system. 2 Institutional misfit: The legacy of the Bonn republic In contrast to the current situation, the West German Federal Republic with its political centre in Bonn used to be a role model for effective consensual governance. The Bonn republic's reputation a...See the full content of this document
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